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Abstract 
Several of the world’s most carbon-intensive industries have no current alternatives to CCS for deep emissions 
reduction because much of the CO2 is unavoidably generated by their production processes, not only from fuel use. 
As a consequence, many models of global decarbonisation foresee a potentially critical role for CCS. 
The importance of CCS in industrial applications is not matched by existing policy attention and in some key 
sectors technological progress is slow. CCS suffers from several market failures that confront other low-carbon 
technologies. In contrast to the power sector, the trade-exposure of the manufacturing and hydrocarbon sectors that 
would need to deploy CCS exacerbates these market failures and poses significant challenges for policy that creates 
the foundations for long-term climate change mitigation. 
Smart policy design will be able to facilitate a transition to a situation in which CCS is actually used to decrease 
costs, specifically those associated with greenhouse gas abatement. In a world that seriously confronts the climate 
challenge the first firms that install CCS will reap the benefits of reducing their marginal production costs and in the 
long run consumers will benefit from lower prices. In addition, producers and users of fossil fuels in sectors where 
marginal abatement costs could be very high, such as transport, will benefit from some relief from emissions costs 
as CCS in industrial applications creates headroom within a declining carbon budget. 
This paper attempts to address two specific questions that policy makers will need to tackle in order to design 
such policies: how could technology development be accelerated to ensure its availability for deployment in the 
2020s?; how might incentive policies be designed to support commercial CCS investments in trade-exposed sectors? 
 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of GHGT. 
Keywords: CCS; climate change; carbon leakage; carbon pricing; cement; steel; chemicals 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 6 79 76 06 26. 
E-mail address: simon.bennett@iea.org 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of GHGT-12
6888   Simon J. Bennett and Wolfgang Heidug /  Energy Procedia  63 ( 2014 )  6887 – 6902 
1. Introduction 
There has been a notable lack of progress in both technology and policy terms for CCS in most industrial 
applications, even compared to CCS in the electricity sector. One important difference compared to the power sector 
is that the products of the industrial sectors for which CCS is seen as a cost-effective mitigation option are 
commodities traded on international markets and their competitiveness is highly sensitive to production costs. CCS 
increases production costs, and the sectors have varying capabilities to pass on that cost to consumers.† Relocations 
of industrial production between countries due to changes in relative production costs are not immaterial to 
governments; they can threaten governments stewardship of their economies and affect employment. 
Enabling trade-exposed sectors to take vital climate change mitigation actions, such as CCS, while retaining a 
competitive position, is a key challenge for CCS policy in a world with fragmented climate policies. 
1.1. Why CCS in industrial applications is considered critical 
At a combined emissions level of over seven gigatonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) in 2011, seven large industrial sectors 
including cement, iron and steel, chemicals and refining accounted for one-fifth of the total of 31 GtCO2‡ emitted 
globally. Emissions from each of these sectors are expected to grow by around 35% up to 2050 under current 
policies [1]. This is primarily because of increasing demand for consumer products and infrastructure and the 
importance of commodities such as steel, cement, liquid fuels and chemicals for the growth of modern economies. 
Materials like steel, carbon fibres and concrete are also fundamental to the supply chains of other low-carbon 
technologies – e.g. wind and nuclear power – that seek sustainable lifecycle performance.  
However, efficiency measures and non-fossil energy options only have the potential to reduce the specific 
emissions from the above sectors’ production by around 30%. As a consequence, without CCS or an equivalent 
breakthrough in materials and fuels production, the total emissions from these sectors will increase if economic 
growth continues at expected rates rather than diminish. In many industrial sectors there are no alternative 
technologies or methods on the horizon in the near- to medium-term to significantly reduce CO2 emissions. CCS can 
help break the link between economic growth and the demand for industrial output, on one hand, and increasing CO2 
emissions, on the other hand. 
1.2. Understanding the heterogeneity of industrial sectors and sites 
The costs of applying CCS will vary between industrial sectors. These sectors produce different quantities and 
purities of CO2, and the impact of using CCS would have different impacts on their production costs. As a result, 
sectors are at different stages of CCS development. Some sectors have already commercialised CO2 capture 
technologies, due to the fact that there is an annual market for over 150 million tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) for use in 
beverages, chemical manufacturing and enhanced oil recovery (EOR) [2]. 
In gas processing, where CO2 is an impurity in extracted natural gas, and hydrogen production (for refining and 
chemicals manufacture), where CO2 is a by-product, CO2 is inherently produced as part of normal operation, little 
additional expense is required to purify and compress it for sale. While technology improvements are foreseen, costs 
are expected to remain between USD 10 and USD 40 per tonne of CO2 avoided for CO2 capture at gas processing 
and hydrogen production facilities [3]. Costs of CO2 capture in several sectors – such as cement and iron and steel – 
remain uncertain due to a lack of experience and are estimated to be higher. 
A range of sector- and site-specific factors will drive costs at individual sites, including: CO2 concentration; CO2 
partial pressure; CO2 volumes; ease of industrial integration; and location [4]. Compared with a single power plant, 
a 90% capture rate may not be realistic at each industrial site that applies CCS. Studies of steel production have 
 
 
† While electricity can also be traded internationally where interconnectors exist, it is more often the case that electricity is traded within 
national borders. 
‡ This total does not take into account emissions from land use, land use change and forestry. 
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found that a practical level of emissions avoidance via CCS for an integrated steelworks may be up to 60% for cost 
and energy penalty reasons [5]. Another example is a refinery site with multiple CO2 sources, some of which have 
low capture costs, for example hydrogen production, but the cost of CO2 capture from the remaining 80% of onsite 
emissions is likely to be much higher [6]. 
1.3. Progress to date 
All large-scale CCS and CO2 capture projects in operation by the first half of 2014 are in fact in industrial 
sectors. Altogether, 32 of the 65 large-scale integrated CO2 capture projects that are listed by the Global CCS 
Institute as being either in planning or operation worldwide are on industrial processes [7]. Sectors that have a clear 
head start in terms of technical maturity have developed the technologies to take advantage of commercial demand 
for cheap CO2 and their relatively low specific costs of CO2 capture. In contrast, the smaller sizes of current CO2 
capture installations in some other industrial sectors, including cement and steel in particular, shows that they are 
significantly lagging behind. 
1.4. Why the need for progress is considered urgent 
For large-scale deployment in the 2020s, it is particularly important that the different CCS technology options are 
tested at progressively larger scales [8]. CO2 capture technologies will move from pilot scale (less than 
0.4 MtCO2/yr) to demonstration scale (1 MtCO2/yr and above) before deployment; each of these phases needs to 
operate for several years to generate the necessary knowledge and cost reductions. If serious emissions cuts are to be 
made by the middle of this century, rapid technical progress is a pressing need. Uncertainty related to costs needs to 
be reduced through additional studies, pilot projects and, most importantly, demonstration projects.  
Just one or two pilot projects to date in each of the sectors with higher cost CO2 sources is an insufficient level of 
experience, scale and diversity for investment in CO2 capture at commercial scales. Sector-specific knowledge of 
the characteristics of the individual flue gas streams in different sectors is vital, in addition to any crossover learning 
between sectors. Uncertain costs are a hindrance to strategy and policy. Subsequent large-scale commercial 
deployment of the technology could take several decades, due to the long-lived nature of manufacturing 
infrastructure and slow turnover of stock. Many cement plants and integrated steelworks operating today were 
established many decades ago – some are 50 years old or more – and usually only undergo major refurbishments in 
line with the lifetimes of key pieces of equipment, often around twenty years. 
This paper focuses on the policy approaches that might be appropriate to overcome the challenges to deploy CCS 
in industry. 
2. Key policy challenges for CCS in industrial applications 
CCS, like other low carbon technologies that are pre-commercial, faces market failures [9]. Five market failures 
that can justify policy intervention have been found to be relevant for the development and deployment of CCS 
(Table 1) [10]. The first two of these are the most significant and interact in a vicious cycle whereby the absence of 
a market driver for investment in projects leads to a lack of knowledge of real-world CCS costs and operation, 
which impedes effective policymaking and raises the risk of investment. These two are considered briefly below. 
2.1. Negative externality: the difficulty of internalising CO2 costs 
Adding the costs of CCS on to the production costs of traded commodities is equivalent to (or greater than) 
internalisation of the costs of CO2 emissions. Climate policies today, including carbon pricing systems, are regional, 
yet trade is often global. If trade across borders is open, cost increases could undermine competitiveness of these 
sectors in regions that pursue independent policies to internalise the social and environmental costs of CO2 
emissions. In comparison with the electricity sector, which is more nationally or regionally organised and where 
costs of more expensive technology can more easily be passed on to customers, regional climate policy in trade 
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exposed sectors can have a more distorting effect. If a firm’s main competitors are outside the regime, then their 
competitors will face no equivalent increases in costs. 
Table 1. Market failures leading to the undersupply of CCS technology and deployment 
 
Market failure Policy objective 
Negative 
externality 
Markets do not take into account the economic, social and environmental costs of CO2 emissions. 
Public good Knowledge about comparative efficacies and costs of different technologies can be considered to be a public good. 
Capital market 
failures 
Information asymmetry and imperfect information can result in under-provision of capital. For example, information about 
CO2 capture costs and performance for early projects may be unequally distributed between different parts of the value 
chain. Capital providers may be unwilling to provide finance if they are unable to assess risk dependably. 
Imperfect 
competition 
Undesirable market power leading to high prices can be exerted by firms that hold monopolistic or oligopolistic positions. 
This is a particular issue for technologies that reply on networks to operate most efficiently. 
Complementary 
markets 
If different parts of the vertical value chain are under different ownership, investments in CO2 capture, transport or storage 
depend upon unpredictable and sub-optimal decisions made by the other two elements. 
 
Facilities whose output competes for market share with production from other countries may only be able to pass 
on some, or even none, of the increases in production costs associated with CO2 abatement. This can undermine the 
economic rationale for CCS, which can involve a significant increase in production costs. In the EU ETS a 30% 
increase of production costs is considered to be the maximum that a firm could tolerate without severely threatening 
international competitiveness [11]. This means that under an incrementally rising regional carbon price, firms could 
become uncompetitive before the carbon price reached the level at which CCS would become viable. The 
consequence can initially be a reduction in capacity utilisation in regulated regions and an increase in non-regulated 
regions. It can also encourage location of new capital investments in non-regulated regions. The competitiveness of 
the sector within that country can fall and “carbon leakage” may result in some circumstances; both outcomes are 
generally considered to be undesirable. 
Looking at the impact of CCS on a sector’s competitiveness, two factors are critical, and they vary between 
sectors: exposure of a sector in a given country to international trade; and the relative impact that CCS would have 
on production cost. If a sector was an “ideal” candidate for the uptake of CCS, it would have both a low exposure to 
global competition and a low impact on the cost of the final product. However, partly because products traded over 
large distances are more likely to be of higher value and margin, no sectors have the ideal combination of low trade 
exposure and low relative cost increases [12]. 
2.2. Knowledge as public good: lack of first-mover advantage 
Another challenge (market failure) facing CCS is the lack of a clear first-mover advantage. Developing CCS at 
pilot or demonstration scale can be a costly undertaking. If the technology is unlikely to be deployed within a 
timeframe in which the knowledge can be competitively appropriated, the costs are likely to outweigh the 
knowledge generated. The ability of a single firm to reap the rewards of technology investment are further reduced 
if technology projects are costly and individual firms are less able to contribute to an overall solution, increasing the 
risks of so-called free riders. In trade-exposed sectors the threats to competitiveness can be greater if competitor 
firms, which are not covered by equivalent climate policies, do not make equally large investments in technology 
development. 
First movers can also face a regulatory dilemma. While the development of technological solutions can be an 
insurance investment against future regulation and can have reputational benefits for a firm, the commercial-scale 
demonstration of the technology can increase the likelihood that its use will be compelled by regulatory measures. 
This dilemma can constrain the extent to which firms are willing to invest in the early stages of technology 
demonstration. 
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2.3. A challenging climate for addressing market failures 
The long-term challenge of internalising CO2 costs through CCS has been compounded by economic and 
political realities that have hindered investment in CCS technology projects in the near-term. The economic and 
financial crisis explains some of the lack of progress with CCS in some sectors. Investment in new technologies 
suffers if investment in capacity in general is stifled by falling demand. In order to develop new technology such as 
CCS, prospective operators need confidence that their industrial base will be maintained over the coming decades. 
While expansion of energy-intensive sectors continued in some regions, the regions from which leadership on low 
carbon technologies was expected have suffered most from the financial crisis. Another manifestation of the crisis 
has been the reduction of available public funds for CCS development. 
Changing patterns of capital stock have resulted from demand and competitiveness factors related to the crisis 
but also from other factors, such as the costs of energy, land and labour and the availability of skills. Since 2008, 
industrial capacity additions have often been greatest where the costs of all factors of production are lower and 
where the rates of demand growth are higher. This includes, for example, China and South East Asia. Despite a 
growth in R&D activity in these regions, the geographical disconnect between regions were CCS R&D is primarily 
undertaken and where capital stock is added has grown. 
Another result of the crisis and the changing patterns of capital stock is the current overcapacity in some sectors. 
For example, in the European steel sector, low margins mean that profits can in some cases be absorbed by 
maintenance of existing assets, leaving little available capital for long-term technology development, especially in a 
region where consolidation is more likely than capacity additions. Although, in theory, multinational firms under 
carbon pricing schemes such as the EU ETS could receive windfall profits from the combination of free allowances 
and output reductions [13], these revenues are as likely to be reallocated to regions where returns on investment are 
greater as they are to be invested in low-carbon technology. Between 2006 and 2012, China added 440 million 
tonnes of steel capacity, more than double the total European capacity [14]. However, today it has 200 million 
tonnes of unused capacity and its steel mills operate today below the worldwide average capacity utilisation [15]. 
3. Stepwise policy for CCS in industrial applications 
Deploying CCS for climate change mitigation purposes requires policy action. Effective support for CCS calls 
for a combination of policy tools within a coherent policy architecture, where each policy addresses a separate 
challenge or market failure. To combine flexibility and certainty, a “gateway” approach that sets policy within a 
stable framework, so that the broad architecture and rules of policy evolution are certain, has been proposed [16]. 
This approach has clearly defined break points that denote changes in policy designed for three difference phases. 
 
x Phase 1. The aim is to generate the public good of knowledge of different CCS technologies. This phase would 
help identify successful technologies, potential cost reductions and minimise information asymmetries. Early 
projects may not immediately be commercially useful to those undertaking the investment but would be vital to 
secure the option of future timely CCS deployment, which would provide returns to public and private sectors. 
x Phase 2. While sectoral CCS costs remain higher than economy-wide marginal abatement costs, the key aim will 
be to facilitate investment in CCS projects while reducing public spending and risk exposure. In the absence of 
proven cross-sectoral climate policies, the key aim is to address capital market failures and unlock private 
investment in CCS projects for continued learning-by-doing. 
x Phase 3. In the longer-term, the most efficient option is likely to involve addressing the market failure of 
externalised CO2 costs through cross-sectoral, technology neutral penalties, such as carbon pricing. Public 
subsidies would be reduced and costs borne by the private sector. 
3.1. Phase 1: Technology demonstration to secure the option of CCS 
The policy goal at this point is not to make emissions reductions per se, but rather to advance CCS technology, 
understand potential cost reductions through learning-by-doing and establish commercial arrangements between the 
different stages of the value chain. This means that such policies will continue to be relevant to some technologies 
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and sectors even after others have moved to the next policy phase. For example, capture technology for cement 
manufacture is currently at the pilot project stage, while that for gas processing and hydrogen production can in 
many cases already be considered commercial, especially if paired with EOR. 
Success is measured in terms of knowledge and cumulative experience provided, rather than in terms of emission 
abatement achieved. Suitable public support instruments for CCS technology development include direct financing, 
such as grants, co-investment equity, debt, credit guarantees and insurance products. If direct capital funding needs 
to be secured to mitigate the risk of insufficient investment in a public good, there are different instruments to 
achieve this. These instruments can share the costs and risks with the private sector in different ways [17]. 
Projects at this stage of development are not profitable in the short term but will provide a public good and a 
(unknown but non zero) reward to first-movers from the private sector. Private sources of financing are likely to be 
unavailable or expensive. The full costs of such projects may need to be shared between the public and private 
parties that will benefit (Table 2). The challenge for policy is to capitalise on the willingness of beneficiaries to 
provide funds in accordance with their priorities, risk and ability to commit. Public funding generates leverage for 
governments to disseminate information generated from projects. This has been accounted for in many public 
funding agreements for CCS projects [18, 19]. 








Direct The development of  CCS technology would enable them to meet their emissions obligations at lower cost. 
Governments with 
a stake in the 
sectors 
Direct Energy-intensive industries and raw material exports are potentially highly valuable to many countries 
future prosperity for geographical, structural and balance-of-trade reasons. These governments may benefit 
most from supporting sectors and technologies in which they see a comparative advantage. 
CCS equipment  
and service 
providers 





If the world has a limited amount of CO2 that it can emit from fossil fuel use over the coming decades in 
order to stabilise the global climate then the only way it can use more fossil fuels than prescribed by this 
“carbon budget” is through the use of CCS. This includes fossil fuels used by CCS-equipped sectors and 
others, such as transport. The refining sector therefore indicates a potential intersection of incentives. 
Fossil fuel users Indirect CCS in industrial applications could create headroom for other emissions that are less attractive to avoid. 
The provision of liquid transport fuels to the airline or passenger vehicles sectors, where CO2 abatement 
may be very expensive, is an example. 
Purchasers of 
‘green’ CO2 
Direct Those that could make use of the captured CO2. Policy can create incentives for chemical or fuel producers 
to incorporate CO2 as a raw material. The European Commission has proposed that renewable liquid and 
gaseous fuels of non-biological origin shall be considered to be four times the energy content of other 
biofuels [20]. Under the German Energy Act, however, only fuels made from CO2 that is mainly from 
renewable sources could be eligible for subsidies [21]. 
3.1.1. International sectoral cooperation 
Many of the benefits to the private sector are knowledge-based and relate to gaining an understanding of 
technology operation and commercial practices. Knowledge is a nonrival but excludable good, which is 
undersupplied by the market and first movers are wary of free riders. As new knowledge can benefit a community of 
beneficiaries and be shared at zero marginal cost, a CCS project may be considered a good investment for a sector if 
the costs were spread between all participants but a poor investment for a single firm with large upfront costs and 
uncertain returns. 
Sectoral approaches to climate change policy have been proposed to overcome regional differences in policy 
[22]. Here we use the term to refer to collaboration on technology development that can benefit all willing actors in 
 Simon J. Bennett and Wolfgang Heidug /  Energy Procedia  63 ( 2014 )  6887 – 6902 6893
a given sector. It can help the international community target areas where technological breakthroughs are needed, 
capital investment is long-lived and where incentives to constrain emissions are inadequate [23, 24]. 
Collaboration can reduce the costs to each actor of insuring against future high carbon prices or strict climate 
regulation, despite reducing the ability of each firm to gain an advantage from the resulting knowledge. It may not 
be limited to collaboration within a sector; firms in different sectors are typically not in competition with one 
another and have an incentive to identify non-competitive technology areas. Cross-sectoral collaboration to test 
various flue gas capture options on different flue gases could be of interest in this respect, especially through open-
access facilities. 
Sectors could agree to targets and timetables for the development of CO2 capture technologies and pool or 
coordinate effort in consortia to achieve them, especially in areas that are considered further from core competitive 
competences. Pledges under technology-oriented sectoral cooperation might be credited in terms of GHG reductions 
or linked to global benchmarking and diffusion of best practice under international agreements. 
In the case of CCS, much of the value chain is outside the current operational competence of the steel and cement 
sectors. This is of particular importance in these sectors, for which the core production equipment is supplied by a 
small number of engineering firms rather than being the intellectual property of the operators themselves. Partners 
could undertake engineering and cost studies of CO2 capture options and process integration, and jointly lead 
promising technologies through sequential stages from pilot to demonstration scale. The Ultra-Low CO2 
Steelmaking (ULCOS) and the European Cement Research Academy (ECRA), both in Europe, are two examples of 
industry-led initiatives on which technology-oriented sectoral cooperation could build. 
Sectoral cooperation could also proceed as a means to generate funds for technology development. The 
Australian Coal Association voluntary contribution scheme is an example of a low level of burden spread across a 
large industrial output [25]. Schemes that hypothecate revenue from emissions trading to fund CCS projects, for 
example, implicitly recognize the need to spread costs across as many beneficiaries as possible. Another example, 
which has been suggested by the European Commission, is to require suppliers of fossil fuels to buy CCS 
certificates equivalent to a proportion of their embedded emissions [26]. The funds from the certificates could be 
used to fund CCS projects that would benefit the purchasers of the certificates in the longer term. 
3.2. Phase 2: Ensuring investment for early deployment 
Phase 2 in the proposed gateway approach employs policy instruments that enable a wider supported roll-out of 
the technology in commercial markets. The priority is to address the lack of capital available to projects that can 
further move the technology along the learning curve. CO2 costs cannot be fully internalised by the private sector, 
primarily due to trade exposure concerns. As with many existing support schemes for renewable energy, cleaner 
production is rewarded and the competitiveness risks associated with the CO2 cost externality are reduced. Early 
deployment is a transitional period between Phase 1 and Phase 2. 
A desirable policy package for trade-exposed sectors will differentiate between sectors according to technological 
maturity and competitiveness concerns. It will also transfer risk and responsibility to the private sector as the phase 
proceeds. We have formulated five principles of such a policy package in Table 3. 
Table 4 provides estimations of the compatibility of these principles with a number of selected policy measures, 
indicating that combinations of instruments are necessary to guide trade-exposed sectors through Phase 2. While 
various instruments could have particular merits in certain regions or contexts, CO2 purchase commitments seem 
particularly interesting due to their potential to address the greatest number of principles simultaneously. 
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Table 3. Five principles to guide policy making for Phase 2 
 
Principle Description of measure that would fit this principle 
Cross-sectoral Does not discriminate against any sector and incentivises lower cost opportunities to gain learning about CO2 capture, 
transport and storage. For example, CCS for hydrogen production for ammonia synthesis would precede CCS for steel 
production. Reduces  administrative complexity 
Continuous incentive 
to abate 
Provides an incentive to abate an additional tonne of CO2 at the margin. Unlike performance standards, which can set a 
threshold to abatement levels. 
Shares investment 
risks with private 
sector 
Addresses capital market failures but reduce the risk burden on the public sector as development progresses 
Reduces operational 
risks 
Minimises risks of stranded CCS assets in order to deliver continued learning and value-for-money. Incentives could 
be contingent on operating the CCS facility, such as those that target quantities of CO2 captured and stored (e.g. 
portfolio standards) and those that are linked to prices (e.g. production subsidies and CO2 pricing).  
Long-term potential 
for market support 
Could ultimately regulate CO2 emissions in a technology neutral manner without imposing continuing costs or expert 
project assessments on government. Do not significantly interfere with other policy measures in ways that reduce 
motivation to innovate, lower economy-wide carbon prices or insulate sectors from competition.  
 
Table 4. Potential incentive mechanisms that could be considered for early deployment 
 















Investment tax credit Yes Potentially Yes No No 
Public co-investment in projects Yes Potentially Yes No No 
Production/emissions subsidy No Yes No Potentially No 
Emissions performance standard No No No Yes Yes 
Portfolio standard No Up to a set limit No Yes Yes 
Feebate penalty and reward system No Yes No No Yes 
CO2 purchase commitment Yes Up to a set limit No Potentially No 
Production tax credit Yes Yes No Yes No 
CO2 tax/cap and trade Yes Yes/Potentially No Partly Yes 
Baseline and credit reward system No Yes No Partly Yes 
 
3.2.1. CO2 purchase commitments as a potential support mechanism for early deployment 
In this section, one incentive mechanism is selected for further discussion. It will not necessarily be appropriate 
in all cases and is unlikely to be sufficient in any sector or region by itself. Nevertheless is does offer a number of 
advantages compared to other options and these are explored further. The concept of CO2 purchase commitments is 
as follows: 
 
x A government would announce its intention to purchase a quantity of stored CO2 each year. This could include 
commitment to purchase an increasing minimum amount of CO2 in future years, providing some certainty 
regarding volume and duration. 
x Firms whose CO2 was stored rather than emitted would be issued with certificates verifying the amount of CO2 
stored in accordance with a regulatory regime that provides confidence that the CO2 is geologically retained 
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x Firms would then be able to sell these certificates to a government agency, which would purchase at the lowest 
available price, for example in a reverse auction. Reverse auctions held in advance can reduce public risk but will 
raise the project investment risk and remove the marginal incentive for continued abatement. 
x A market for the certificates could be allowed to develop if parties had different expectations about certificate 
price evolution and wished to hedge their risks. 
 
In addition to meeting the principle of cross-sectoral neutrality, CO2 purchase contract mechanisms could have 
little or no impact on competitiveness for trade-exposed sectors because additional costs of CCS would be covered. 
By targeting a fixed quantity of CO2 stored, rather than subsidising output, producers’ cost and market price 
uncertainties can be addressed. If the market can withstand it, however, a competitive market for certificates could 
encourage firms to accept higher shares of the cost and risk in order to make competitive bids. The competitiveness 
of reverse auctions is central to the efficiency of the instrument. Governments could pay above the socially efficient 
level for CO2 abatement and carbon leakage avoidance if reverse auctions are not sufficiently competitive, including 
double counting under carbon pricing or other systems designed to reduce emissions and maintain competitiveness. 
On the other hand, reducing the amount of competition in the market by implementing some bilateral multi-year 
contracts – even before investments in CO2 capture facility are taken – could guarantee revenues for operation.§ This 
would increase the number of potential participants in sectors where CCS is further from cost-effectiveness and 
where first-movers run the risk of being undercut in later auctions. As perfect technology neutrality would neglect 
sectors with higher capture costs and competitiveness risks, uneven technology learning and a lack of mature 
technologies passing to Phase 3 of support would result. CO2 purchase commitments could be flexible enough to 
allow government to commit to purchasing a certain proportion of the certificates from a specific sector. 
This flexibility gives CO2 purchase commitments some options to target specific investment risks and technology 
priorities. Nevertheless, the funding that would allow governments to make upfront commitments, especially over 
extended periods, would still need to be secured. In some countries, the raising of revenue for such a system could 
be linked to the repeal of fossil fuel subsidies, which amounted to USD 523 billion in 2011 [27]. Some of the same 
instruments suggested for Phase 1 could be appropriate to spread the burden thinly across public and private 
beneficiaries alike, e.g. sectoral levies, certificates or hypothecation of CO2 pricing revenues. Carefully structured 
capital or production tax credits could furthermore help facilitate access to capital and address competitiveness 
concerns to reduce risk premiums. Collaboration between countries could reduce the effective level of national 
trade-exposure and thus increase the opportunities to share the cost burden with operators. 
3.2.2. Other possible policy tools 
The competitiveness impacts of climate policy relate to trade exposure and the cost impact of mitigation 
measures such as CCS. 
Some sectors are less trade-exposed and some cost-sharing between firms and government may be preferable. In 
the cement sector, for example, portfolio standards could be applied as the products are relatively homogenous. The 
portfolio standard could, in fact, complement a CO2 purchase commitment by setting a proportion of production that 
would need to be covered by CCS, a declining percentage of which would be purchased by the government each 
year through reverse auctions. Note, however, that EUR 15 to EUR 20 has been proposed as an ETS price that could 
stimulate imports of cement to the EU [28]. 
Sectors that are trade-exposed but where the potential cost impact of CCS would be lower may also be 
incentivised through portfolio standards, such as the certificate scheme for the fossil fuel production sectors 
mentioned in Section 3.1.1. However, higher levels of trade exposure may mean that lower proportions of CO2 
 
 
§ Longer contract lengths would limit a government’s ability to profit from future cost savings and lower-cost market entrants. Thus, the 
contracted proportion of the CCS project’s full capacity could be reduced over the lifetime of the project and the remainder would be subject to 
bidding in reverse auctions to increase public value for money. The volume and length of these contracts would need to be calibrated according to 
the risk that CCS capacity could become stranded if future projects benefit from cost reductions or cheaper CO2, and the impact of this risk on the 
attractiveness of the investment proposition and the overall benefit of future cost reductions. Contract prices could be determined through a tender 
process linked to external factors such as fuel prices and carbon prices, minimising any premium paid for bilateral contracts. 
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production can be covered by certificates. Other possible mechanisms to address less trade-exposed sectors include 
emissions performance standards and feebates. An approach to emissions performance standards is to apply them on 
a lifecycle basis, as is the case with the European Fuel Quality Directive [29]. Emissions performance standards in 
the natural gas production sector could be set at a level that obliges producers of acid gas (with high CO2 content) to 
store the separated CO2 in order to be able to access the natural gas market. Experience in Norway and Australia 
suggests that such an approach, even at a national level, could avoid the venting of pure CO2. 
Designing the basis for both production subsidies and portfolio standards is inherently complex in sectors that 
have product differentiation (e.g. different steel qualities) or multiple product streams from single plants (e.g. 
refining). 
A further approach to supporting early commercial projects could be to link emissions reductions from industrial 
processes with other policy mechanisms in less trade-exposed sectors. This type of approach would be similar in 
concept to offsets in some emissions trading sectors, i.e. it would allow firms with an emissions reduction incentive 
and a high marginal abatement cost to benefit from cheaper mitigation options in other sectors. A conceivable 
situation could be one in which electricity suppliers can benefit from financial support for the application of CCS to 
their power plant (or face an emissions performance standard) but can equally benefit from the same level of support 
if they invest in a CCS project of the same magnitude in a sector with lower CCS costs. 
3.2.3. Reducing trade exposure instead of compensating for it 
Higher levels of trade exposure potentially require governments to take on more of the costs and risks of CCS if 
the application of climate policy is not equal in all regions. An alternative to increasing the public burden is to take 
steps to reduce trade exposure. Figure 1 shows trade exposure levels for three sectors and selected countries that 
have current CCS activities. The trade exposure metric used is that which is employed for assessment of carbon 
leakage in the EU emission trading system. 
Figure 2 shows the impact of recalculating the index for the hypothetical case in which trade with specific 
partners were not considered to be exports. The resulting percentages show by how much the index would be 
reduced by for each country and each partner. High percentages indicate that if` policies in the two countries were 
aligned, they would not need to overcome high trade-related policies in the two countries were aligned, they would 
not need to overcome high trade-related barriers to implementation. Black cells indicate that the findings for the two 
countries are symmetric; for a country that would benefit most from coordination a given partner, the partner would 
also benefit most from coordination with that country. Canada and the US, France and Germany and Japan and 
Korea appear to be good candidate pairs for greater cooperation in CCS in industrial applications. To a large extent 
in EU countries, cooperation already exists. 
3.3. Phase 3: Internalising CO2 costs for wide deployment 
The priority of this phase is to abate CO2 emissions and fully internalise CO2 costs within firms’ decision-
making, while accounting for any regional differences and carbon leakage risks. Wide deployment would proceed 
after Phase 2 if CCS is a cost-effective option in a given sector, ideally within a broader technology-neutral climate 
policy on a global level. MultiǦsector or economyǦwide carbon pricing, performance standards or combinations of 
these, such as a trading system with emissions benchmarking, would be possible instruments. In Norway, the 
introduction of a USD 55/tCO2 carbon price for the oil and gas sector in the early 1990s triggered the 
implementation of CCS for gas processing, a technology that was relatively mature [30]. 
As a highly capital intensive technology, CCS investment risk varies strongly with carbon price volatility and 
long-run societal costs might be reduced by a carbon price floor. Abadie and Chamorro estimate that CO2 trigger 
prices for CCS could rise by a factor of four for the case where carbon price volatility is 50% rather than 0% [31]. 
Some continued support may be justified even under a functional and inclusive CO2 emissions system and may be 
vital under asymmetric carbon pricing in different regions. 
It could be challenging for governments to justify continued support for CCS in the third phase if it is still a 
relatively expensive CO2 abatement option. This is especially true for countries with cap and trade systems whereby 
public support for CCS would not reduce the overall emissions under the CO2 emissions cap. But, as policies move 
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from supporting technology learning to internalising the CO2 externality, tools such as free allocation, BCAs or 
equivalent may be essential to account for regional policy differences. 
 
Fig. 1 Selected national trade exposure indices for the refining (top) iron and steel (middle) and cement (bottom) sectors 
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Fig. 2 Impact of policy cooperation on trade exposure in the refining (top) iron and steel (middle) and cement (bottom) sectors 
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3.3.1. Free allocation or tax exemptions 
Free allocations or tax exemptions/rebates may be necessary for the duration of the period that a global carbon 
price is not in effect. To retain competitiveness and protect against carbon leakage while incentivising CCS, free 
allocations would need to be based on emissions intensity before the addition of CCS, and linked to output rather 
than installed capacity to avoid abatement through reduced capacity utilisation [32]. In addition, strong political 
commitments or “front loading” of a firms’ allocation could encourage investments in assets with multi-decade 
lifetimes compared to the shorter timeframes on which free allocation or tax rebates are generally determined. 
If the level of free allocation is sufficient to avoid carbon leakage, it provides no incentive by itself for the 
adoption of mitigation technologies or continued low carbon innovation. In theory a firm might apply CCS if its 
costs were lower than carbon prices and if its entitlement to the free allocation were not diminished by applying 
CCS. In practice, however, firms are likely to value the certainty of free allocation more highly than the uncertainty 
of carbon prices, especially if CCS costs are not considerably lower than carbon prices. More importantly, perhaps, 
firms are likely to perceive a significant risk that for budgetary reasons governments might remove their entitlement 
to free allocation after the installation of CCS and before the investment in CCS is paid off.  
3.3.2. Border carbon adjustments (BCA) 
BCA is alternative to free allocation or tax rebates for trade-exposed sectors that are sensitive to carbon prices 
[33]. BCA regimes could prevent carbon leakage and preserve regional competitiveness by levelling the playing 
field. It has been noted that the absence of a carbon price on imports could comprise an implicit subsidy to dirtier 
production in non-regulated markets [34]. 
To incentivise CCS, the protection afforded by a BCA would need to remain after CCS were installed and long-
term binding commitment to this might be required to overcome investment risks. The BCA would need to 
distinguish between different types of product within a sector, e.g. different types of steel, to avoid unequal impacts 
on more CO2-intense production processes within a sector. BCA schemes that cover only basic materials and not 
manufactured goods could disadvantage domestic manufactured goods yet applying BCAs to all manufactured 
goods would be highly complex and trade flows may re-route to minimise cost impacts [35]. Consequently, BCAs 
may be more easily applied in sectors such as cement (where products are more homogenous), compared to refining 
or steel production, all else being equal. 
3.3.3. Inclusion of consumption within carbon pricing systems 
Noting that output-based free allocation for the cement sector may provide some of the right signals for CCS but 
would not incentivise clinker substitution, consumer choices for composite cement or product substitutes, a 
complementary approach has been mooted [36]. Inclusion of consumption within carbon pricing systems could 
involve making firms liable for a charge on their consumption of products from energy-intensive sectors regardless 
of whether these products, such as clinker, were sourced domestically or imported. The intention would be to pass 
on a proxy for carbon cost to downstream users without imposing the cost on the primary producer. Downstream 
products freely traded nationally and internationally would bear the carbon price as they are for tobacco and liquor 
in the EU ETS today. 
In comparison to BCA, this option may avoid free trade concerns. The practicalities remain to be explored, 
including how to ensure that competing products using raw materials from different sectors all face comparable 
carbon costs. 
4. Delivering success: addressing the other market failures 
If the undersupply of CCS knowledge, capital and the externalisation of CO2 costs are overcome, successful 
deployment of CCS will still demand that other market failures are also addressed during the three phases. 
4.1. Imperfect competition 
Multi-year, bilateral CO2 purchase contracts, incentives linked to previous production levels and public grants for 
projects that are not optimised for future network expansion can disadvantage later entrants into CCS. These aspects 
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can be mitigated by reducing the lengths of contracts for CO2 or allocating to the public the risk that future local 
sources of CO2 do not emerge to fill pipelines that are designed with future network expansion in mind. Monopoly 
power in CO2 transport networks has been dealt with in existing regulations; see [37, 38]. 
4.2. Complementary markets 
It has been suggested that CO2 capture development in industrial applications need only proceed once CO2 
transport and storage have been developed and commercialised by other sectors and third parties. Energy-intensive 
industries highlight the acute need for a commercial CO2 transport and storage business to become available for the 
off-take of captured CO2. Yet, the developers of transport and storage solutions, who typically are not in the same 
sectors, may equally insist that the opposite be true. Governments can be instrumental in reducing the first-mover 
risks on both sides. 
It is unlikely that many heavy-emitting firms, with the possible exception of refiners and gas producers, will 
evolve to become integrated into the CO2 storage business in the near to medium term. If CO2 emitting firms prefer 
to contract with third parties for the capture, transport and storage of their CO2, this will create complexity and 
potentially add costs associated with the transfer of liability. While this presents a coordination challenge for some 
sectors, the vertical integration of refining and gas processing into CO2 transport and storage presents an 
opportunity. Vertical integration can overcome the additional costs associated with contracting in the value chain 
and skill shortages for early projects.  
Ensuring that players in different sectors and different parts of the value chain are coordinated can also enable 
deployment at a local level. The evolution of clusters of CCS-equipped industrial facilities could be promoted by 
government to help sectors be “CCS ready” and plan to share a local CO2 transport and storage infrastructure, which 
could be anchored by the presence of CCS on a major local emitter in the power sector. Planning for the stepwise 
deployment of CCS in major industrial clusters includes investigating accessible CO2 storage sites, engaging all 
actors in CCS policy discussions and considering requirements that would make local sectors increasingly CCS 
ready. 
5. Conclusions 
The key difference between developing policy for CCS in industrial applications compared to the electricity 
sector is that it must take greater account of both trade-exposure and the lack of alternatives for low-carbon 
production in some sectors. These issues can exacerbate the impacts of market failures in comparison to the 
electricity sector. A further crucial difference is the range of different CO2 capture costs and scales in different 
industry sectors and within sectors. 
In a gateway approach, different policy instruments will be appropriate in the three different phases. The types of 
instruments used in the three phases must dovetail with one another to avoid breaks or unmanageable changes in 
support. The sources of funding in Phase 1 and Phase 2 might, for example, come from the same sources. As the 
available funds are likely to be constrained in the near term in most regions of the world, it is important that policy 
makers consider whether costs can be shared appropriately with the beneficiaries of CCS knowledge and experience. 
The types of instruments that will be appropriate at different times will also vary by sector and technology. While 
some technologies are already mature and available to be deployed to assist with learning-by-doing for CO2 storage, 
others are less mature for reasons of costa and trade exposure. Less mature (in terms of CCS) and more trade-
exposed sectors are likely to be motivated to undertake CCS projects more by “carrots” than “sticks” in the near 
term. Policy makers would be encouraged to build carefully on willingness to develop CCS technologies and 
projects where it already exists. In sectors such as steel and cement in developed countries this willingness is often 
fragile. 
We conclude that climate policy and industrial policy interact strongly in the area of CCS in industrial 
applications and governments urgently need to reconcile the two if they are to secure the necessary technology 
progress in a timely manner. 
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